


#161

4 Apr 2002

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

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*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

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Posted on Sun, Mar. 31, 2002

## **Eagan company product seems to kill anthrax**

**BY TOM MAJESKI**

**Pioneer Press**

A small biotechnology company in Eagan has developed a complex carbohydrate from the cell walls of baker's yeast that appears to kill anthrax spores in the lungs of mice and may combat the deadly effects of radiation.

If the carbohydrate works as well in humans exposed to anthrax spores as it does in mice, it could become an effective weapon in the war against bioterrorism without triggering antibiotic-resistant strains associated with current drug treatments, the researchers say.

"It's real promising, but more research needs to be done," cautioned David Walsh, a spokesman for Biopolymer Engineering Inc., an Eagan-based company that holds patents on a number of carbohydrate-based products it sells as dietary supplements.

In a study released earlier this month at a bioterrorism conference in Albuquerque, N.M., the researchers showed the carbohydrate — called beta 1, 3 glucan — significantly increased the survival rates in mice infected with deadly anthrax spores.

The studies were conducted by scientists at Biopolymer; an agency of the Canadian Department of National Defence called the Defence Research Establishment Suffield; and Biophage Pharma Inc., a Canadian biopharmaceutical company.

Walsh said glucan stimulates the immune systems in mice, making them powerful enough to kill anthrax spores in the lungs before the deadly pathogens have a chance to germinate and produce deadly toxins.

Earlier last week, Biopolymer reached an agreement with the U.S. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute to test the radiation-protection characteristics of glucan.

Studies by other researchers show that glucan injected into mice exposed to lethal doses of radiation speeds the recovery of their white blood cells and boosts their survival rate. Researchers from Biopolymer and the institute want to test the effectiveness of orally delivered glucan on mice exposed to lethal doses of radiation.

"Out in the field, you don't want to give needles to soldiers so they could inject themselves," Walsh said. "It's not very practical. You want to develop an anti-radiation pill."

In the anthrax studies, mice injected with glucan two days before being injected with a lethal dose of spores had an 80 percent survival rate, compared with a 30 percent survival rate in untreated mice.

In addition, mice treated orally with glucan seven days before being infected with anthrax had a 100 percent survival rate compared to 50 percent in the control group. Mice treated with glucan after being exposed to anthrax had a 90 percent survival rate compared to 30 percent for the control group.

"The findings are consistent with the wide range of anti-infective studies" involving glucan, Walsh said. "It shows the potential for developing an effective treatment for anthrax without creating antibiotic-resistant strains."

Gary Ostroff, Biopolymer's vice president of research and development, said glucan "has the potential to provide broad protection against a lot of agents, including gram positive and gram negative bacteria and parasites."

Walsh said beta 1, 3 glucan is well known in the research field as an immune system enhancer. Glucan binds with receptors on macrophages, a type of white blood cell that detects bacteria, viruses and other pathogens and

coordinates the body's defenses against them. The glucan enhances the macrophages' ability to identify and destroy foreign invaders.

The researchers now are doing studies to determine proper dosage amounts and schedules, as well as how glucan enhances standard antibiotic treatments. Ostroff said he and his colleagues also would like to test glucan against other bioterrorism pathogens, including smallpox, the plague and tularemia.

Meantime, they plan to start testing the carbohydrate in primates within six months and complete them within a year. He said both the Canadian and U.S. defense departments will be involved in those studies.

"The results we have are very encouraging and support further research," Ostroff said. "It's the first critical step."

Biopolymer Engineering, which was founded in 1997, has about 50 employees, 22 of whom work in Eagan. The rest work at a company plant in Central America.

<http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/local/2963342.htm>

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03/31/2002 - Updated 08:21 PM ET

## **Use of smallpox vaccine may be problematic**

By Anita Manning, USA TODAY

The USA is amassing an abundant supply of smallpox vaccine, but health officials say they are not recommending that it be widely used — yet.

The vaccine currently on hand, 15.4 million doses in a government stockpile and more than 85 million doses that drug maker Aventis Pasteur says it will add to that, is safe and effective but can cause problems, says D.A. Henderson, director of the Office of Public Health Preparedness. Many people develop painful swelling around the site of the inoculation, headache and nausea. In people with weakened immune systems, the live-virus vaccine can cause illness. And in one to two people per million, it can cause death.

"When smallpox was around," Henderson says, "the risk was so great, with a 30% death rate, we were prepared to accept a level of complications from the vaccine."

Now, he says, "we have to ask the question, what is the risk of smallpox being introduced? We think it's extremely low."

Routine smallpox vaccination stopped in the USA in the early 1970s, and the last naturally occurring case of smallpox in the world was in 1977. The only known remaining stocks of virus are in two laboratories, one at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and the other in Russia. Bioterrorism experts fear that criminals or rogue governments could have illicit supplies of smallpox virus that could be used as a weapon of mass destruction.

Several months ago, the CDC outlined a plan to respond to such an attack by isolating the initial victims and vaccinating everyone who had come into contact with them, forming a ring of immunized people around the virus and preventing it from spreading. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson says that plan remains in effect. The vaccine stockpile is an "insurance policy that will provide greater security to all Americans," he says.

But while "there's ongoing discussion at the highest level of government and throughout America about vaccination," he says, "there's no change in what CDC has come up with so far."

In a special issue of The New England Journal of Medicine devoted to smallpox vaccine, which was released last week a month ahead of publication, Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, calls for public debate about whether smallpox vaccine should be made widely available.

Such discussion "should be initiated before any attack occurs," he writes. It should take into account both the benefits of a mass immunization campaign, including eliminating the threat of smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon, and the disadvantages, which include the vaccine's side effects.

Scientists are working to develop newer, safer vaccines, Fauci says, but that takes time. "If we could vaccinate people with virtually no incidence of any serious toxicity, we could eliminate the threat of a smallpox bioterrorism attack tomorrow," he says. "That clearly is not the case."

<http://www.usatoday.com/news/healthscience/health/bioterrorism/2002-04-01-usat-smallpox-vaccine-full.htm>

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## **Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness,**

by JayEtta Z. Hecker, director, physical infrastructure issues, before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, in San Francisco, California. GAO-02-550T, April 2.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-550T>

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Salt Lake Tribune  
March 30, 2002

### **Tooele Continues To Disarm**

By Glen Warchol, The Salt Lake Tribune

TOOELE -- After celebrating the destruction of the most dangerous nerve agent at the Army's Deseret Chemical Depot, officials there are preparing for the next round in the nation's effort to safely rid itself of its aging stockpile of chemical weapons.

Upward of 2.5 million pounds of VX agent and 12 million pounds of mustard gas still sit in bunkers out in the desert after the last 1-ton container of sarin -- aka GB nerve agent -- was destroyed March 15 at 4:05 p.m.

The more than 10 million pounds of sarin were the most dangerous part of the enormous stockpile in Tooele County and their destruction was a milestone in the controversial program of incinerating the deadly weapons.

Based on the Army's analysis, upward of 90 percent of the stockpile's risk to the community has been eliminated with the destruction of the sarin.

"We are thrilled," said Kari Sagers, Tooele County's emergency management director. "We'll be glad when the whole stockpile is gone, but destroying the GB is a great relief to everyone." In the next few weeks, the incinerator will be prepared for the second of three stockpile demilitarization phases, or campaigns. If everything goes well, Army contractors will begin burning VX in late May or early June. Barring any mishaps or technical problems, the last of the VX will be destroyed in 13 months.

Then the final destruction campaign, for blister -- or mustard agent -- will begin. By 2005, the Army hopes, the stockpile and its potential as a terrorist target should be eliminated.

Watchdog groups, led by Families Against Incinerator Risk (FAIR), have criticized incineration as a dangerous and ecologically unsound way to dispose of the chemical agents.

The successful conclusion of the GB campaign at Tooele has not changed that.

"We are definitely at a fork in the road," said FAIR spokesman Jason Groenewold. "We are only half way through the stockpile and the most difficult part lies ahead. VX is nasty, nasty stuff."

Critics would like to see the Army take this lull in the program to consider changing to chemical neutralization of the remaining agent. The science is basic. Mustard agent -- the Model T of chemical warfare -- can be neutralized with water. VX takes water and chemicals found under a kitchen sink. The process leaves dangerous secondary products to be disposed of, but proponents of neutralization say that is better than the risk of the incinerator venting toxins into the atmosphere.

Four of the eight other chemical weapons stockpiles around the nation will be disposed of with chemical neutralization rather than incineration and, says Groenewold, it's time for Utah to join them.

"What's frustrating in Utah is that everyone else is getting the latest technology and we are left with a dilapidated, Rube Goldberg contraption the Army calls an incinerator."

Tooele's managers bristle at that description, saying the incinerator, already safe, has been vastly improved through changes and "lessons learned" during the GB program. The plant has had only one minuscule leak of GB into the atmosphere, in May 2000.

"We have a technology we are confident works," said the incinerator's new project manager, Dale Ormond.

Besides, the VX will be burned long before a chemical neutralization plant could be set up, said Ted Ryba, deputy project manager.

"Going to alternative technologies really doesn't gain us any efficiency," he said.

But Groenewold said the Army is stalling and, so far, refuses to see how much neutralization could be done with equipment already at Tooele.

"The Army has a history of withholding critical information from communities," he said. "It would take very little except a resolve on their part."

Alternative methods will be examined for Tooele, but they are unlikely to ever be a major part of the program, Ormond said. "Incineration is the fastest way to get rid of these chemical munitions."

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Seattle Post-Intelligencer

March 29, 2002

## **Army's Plan For Mustard Gas Resisted By Oregon**

By Brad Cain, The Associated Press

SALEM, Ore. -- After getting a briefing from a top U.S. Army official, Gov. John Kitzhaber said yesterday he is not ready to embrace the Army's proposal to speed up the destruction of deadly mustard gas stockpiles at the Umatilla Chemical Depot.

Kitzhaber met with Assistant Secretary of the Army Mario Fiori for 30 minutes to hear details of the proposal that the 2,440 tons of mustard gas stored at Umatilla be neutralized with water instead of burned in a massive incinerator. Kitzhaber described the meeting as cordial but said it didn't ease his concerns about the large amount of water that would be needed and about the "eleventh-hour" nature of the Army's proposal that caught Umatilla County residents by surprise.

The Umatilla Chemical Depot has completed construction of an incinerator to burn the chemical weapons and will begin testing it with dummy rockets in May. The Army stores nearly 4,000 tons of chemical weapons, including mustard, sarin and VX, in concrete bunkers.

The Army must destroy the weapons by 2008 under an international treaty. It is scheduled to begin incineration next February.

Kitzhaber said there are many unanswered questions surrounding the Army's new proposal. He said he's leery of any method that would divert large amounts of water that's badly needed by farmers in the arid region around the depot. Then there's the issue of the 27 million gallons of contaminated water the process would create.

"Where are we going to send it? Who's going to take it," Kitzhaber said. "I'm not going to sign off on anything if we aren't totally confident it will meet all relevant environment safeguards."

Fiori, in an interview after the meeting, said Kitzhaber showed a "very good understanding" of the technical issues involved and that the governor indicated a willingness to further consider the plan.

"We put a lot of issues on the table, and we're going to continue talking," the assistant Army secretary said.

Fiori said that the Army now favors neutralizing the mustard agent with water over incineration because it would save millions of dollars and speed up disposal of those weapons by two years or more.

"Whenever you propose something new and different, people have a lot of concerns and questions," he said. "But destruction of the stockpile years earlier is something that everyone should sign off on."

Wednesday, the Pentagon said it would use a neutralization to destroy 2,600 tons of mustard gas at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, a victory for residents and state officials who opposed an alternative plan to incinerate the gas. Neutralization plants are also under construction in Maryland and Indiana.

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New York Times  
March 31, 2002

Word For Word/'The Doomsday Scenario'

## **Blast From The Past: A Cold War Vision Of A Nuclear Nightmare**

By Sam Roberts

*Atomic bombs smuggled into America's cities and set off without warning. The nation under attack from the air. Communications and the economy crippled. Chaos in the streets. One in five Americans dead.*

*An apocalyptic Hollywood movie plot? Hardly. In 1958, one year after Nevil Shute published his haunting nuclear holocaust classic "On the Beach," government planners drafted their own top-secret doomsday scenario, speculating in clinical detail about the consequences of a full-scale nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.*

*The Defense Department's Emergency Plans Book, which was declassified by mistake in 1998, has just been published as "The Doomsday Scenario" by MBI Publishing (the book was printed in China, of all places). A historian, L. Douglas Keeney, discovered the plans in the National Archives and annotated the unsugarcoated text, which resonates in the contingency strategies drawn up in Washington after Sept. 11 for preserving government operations and mounting nuclear retaliation.*

*Excerpts from the document and Mr. Keeney's accompanying commentary follow.*

The U.S.S.R. is capable of:

- a. Producing atomic weapons of varying yields ranging from a few kilotons (thousands of tons) to megatons (millions of tons) of TNT equivalent, biological and chemical agents, and incendiary and high-explosive weapons.
- b. Delivering these weapons anywhere within the United States and upon U.S.-deployed forces and Allies by piloted aircraft, submarine-launched missiles or mines or clandestine means. . . .

*The planners here assume that the Soviets were at least on par with our own stockpiles, if not ahead. . . . Even in 1958, it was assumed that America would be attacked by biological and chemical weapons. . . . The ability to deliver weapons "anywhere in the United States" . . . acknowledges that the Soviets had superb aeronautical design and manufacturing capabilities.*

Warning Capabilities:

Weapons launched from submarines may arrive without warning. Likewise, weapons emplaced by clandestine means may be detonated without warning. . . .

*In 1958 little could forewarn when the first nuclear weapons would hit America -- these would be missiles launched from Soviet submarines or bombs hidden inside America. . . . The warning one might expect before a submarine-launched ballistic missile impacted was in the range of 13 minutes. An airborne attack might be preceded by 25 minutes' warning. There would be no warning for a weapon preplaced on American soil. As early as 1958, American intelligence agencies had reason to believe that it was possible to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, place it in a desired location and then control its firing. This is information that has never before been released to the public.*

The Attack:

The U.S.S.R. has made attacks with large numbers of atomic weapons on the United States and on some of its territories, bases overseas and its allies. The domestic air defense warning yellow for the first attack was disseminated two hours before U.S.S.R. aircraft appeared over U.S. frontiers. At the same time as the air defense warning yellow was announced, submarine-launched missiles arrived and weapons emplaced by clandestine means were detonated. However, the major weight of attack has been delivered by manned aircraft.

Air Defense operations in North America and overseas have destroyed a substantial portion of the attacking aircraft, but half of those destroyed had reached the bomb release line and had released their weapons. U.S. and Allied military operations have resulted in casualties and damage to the enemy at least as great as those received.

Notwithstanding severe losses of military and civilian personnel and material, air operations against the enemy are continuing, and our land and naval forces are heavily engaged. Both sides are making use of atomic weapons for tactical air support and in land battle.

*Unfortunately, half of the Soviet planes that they do shoot down have already dropped their bombs. . . . As we counterstrike, we will use nuclear weapons, some of which will explode in our own air space.*

Both on the North American continent and overseas, the major weight of the attacks appears to have been directed on U.S. and Allied military installations. . . . In addition, the District of Columbia and many population and industrial centers have been attacked.

*Washington D.C., is heavily hit (as would be expected). Civilian populations, however, do not seem to be targeted. Why did the planners presume this? The use of weapons against civilian populations is a tactic designed to break an opponent's will to fight, but it has rarely worked. . . . Thus, the Soviets are furiously trying to destroy our capacity to retaliate. They are wasting no bombs on terror strikes.*

The surface bursts have resulted in widespread radioactive fallout of such intensity that over substantial parts of the United States the taking of shelter for considerable periods of time is the only means of survival. . . .

The general level of casualties throughout the United States is extremely serious. In many localities it is catastrophic.

*The population of the United States in 1958 was 140 million. Almost one in five will die.*

Post-Attack Analysis:

With human casualties exceeding material losses, ultimate recuperative potential to meet the requirements of the surviving population is high, providing this population can be adequately motivated. In spite of the magnitude of the catastrophe that has struck the nation and the possibility of additional but lighter attacks, more than 100 million people and tremendous material resources remain. . . .

The attack has caused an almost complete paralysis in the functioning of the economic system in all of its aspects. . . . During the survival period the economy is operating in a highly disorganized manner.

The utilized labor force is engaged in large numbers in disposing of the dead, taking care of surviving injured, decontaminating and cleaning up bombed areas, returning public works and utilities to operation, and other activities related to the direct and immediate effects of the attacks. . . . There are few workers left to produce goods. . . .

Government control is seriously jeopardized and central federal direction is virtually nonexistent. Many of the highest government officials are casualties although the presidential office is functioning. Washington was so severely damaged that no operations there are possible. . . .

In many areas, including several of the largest cities, where surviving injured outnumber the surviving uninjured active adults, the social fabric has ceased to exist in the pre-attack pattern. . . .

*Here we see that even in 1958, the government actually agreed that shelters would be inadequate. Many would be destroyed. Most were too far away to be useful; a large number for whom the shelters were intended would die before they reached them. Those who did get in would be so badly contaminated that they would soon succumb to radiation sickness and die.*

From a pre-attack total of 1.6 million hospital beds, approximately 100,000 are available for use. . . .

The medical care requirements are overwhelming. In addition to 25 million dead or dying, there are 25 million surviving casualties who require emergency medical care. . . . Of the 25 million radiation casualties, 12.5 million have received lethal dosages and have died or will die regardless of treatment. . . .

Inadequate provision for laboratory diagnostic aids has hampered the more accurate determination of degrees of radiation injury. Unless such determinations are made, many lives may be lost because treatment is being given to hopeless cases. . . . The housing situation is critical. . . . In only very isolated situations is the housing inventory adequate to rehouse survivors from attacked areas.

*Does the author contradict an earlier assumption and now say that civilian populations were targeted? Probably not. But collateral damage in nuclear war would be unavoidable and extensive.*

Blast damage has not only completely eliminated major water and sewer networks, but has at the same time dangerously impaired the function of water and sewer facilities in peripheral areas otherwise unaffected by blast and fire damage. . . .

The monetary and credit systems have collapsed in damaged areas and are under severe pressure in those areas overrun with refugees. . . . Bartering, unorganized confiscation and looting are in evidence. . . .

Severe disruption to transportation service exists in all attacked and contaminated areas. . . .

*Yes, production will be curtailed or blocked due to damage, manpower losses and radiation. But the "X" factor is the will of American to get back on its feet. . . . Therein lies the great strength of America: the refusal to backslide into the abyss.*

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## **U.S. To Seek Removal Of Chief Of Chemical Weapons Group**

Accusing the head of a chemical weapons monitoring body of mismanagement and "confrontational conduct," the State Department is taking steps to seek his ouster at a meeting of the 145-member group in three weeks.

A senior official said yesterday that the administration decided on the action after Director General Jose Bustani refused to resign following a vote in which the organization's 41-nation executive committee approved a no-confidence motion. The vote was 17 in support of the motion and five against, with 18 abstentions. Bustani, a Brazilian, heads the technical secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The countries represented in the Netherlands-based organization are subject to regular inspections of suspected chemical weapons stockpiles.

The senior State Department official, asking not to be identified, told reporters the administration plans a major campaign in advance of the special meeting, tentatively set for April 21 and 22, to ensure Bustani's ouster.

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Washington Post

March 30, 2002

Pg. 8

## **N. Korea Reactor Project On Course**

### ***Tensions With U.S. Fail to Derail Accord***

By Doug Struck, Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL -- Though harsh rhetoric continues to fly back and forth between Washington and Pyongyang, an international consortium that includes the United States will apparently continue construction of twin nuclear power reactors in North Korea, according to the chairman of the group doing the work.

"Nobody wants to be the first one to run away" from the 1994 Framework Agreement, "and have the blame at their doorstep," said Chang Sun-Sun, South Korea's ambassador to the project. He was referring to the accord under which the United States, along with South Korea and Japan, agreed to construct the safer, light-water reactors in exchange for North Korea ending its nuclear program. To abandon the agreement, he said, "would have enormous impact on the overall peace and security on the Korean Peninsula."

Both sides recently have issued warnings about the accord. President Bush this month refused to certify North Korea's compliance with the pact, reflecting the administration's dissatisfaction with it. North Korea, in turn, has threatened to abandon the agreement and resume work on older Soviet-built nuclear plants from which it could extract bomb-grade material.

Chang, who also serves as chairman of the project's executive board, called the warnings nothing more than "rhetoric." But he and other analysts predicted that North Korea will not immediately agree with inspections being demanded by the United States -- and called for under the agreement -- which could reveal whether North Korea has made enough plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

First, he said, North Korea wants the consortium to finish more of the construction work on the reactors, for which only the foundations are dug. "They want to see some progress for themselves," he said. "When the concrete pours in August, I think it might have some impact on their way of thinking."

Relations between Washington and Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, have suffered during the Bush administration, which suspended talks with the Stalinist government, labeled it part of an "axis of evil" and listed it as a potential U.S. nuclear target. Bush administration officials have never embraced the Framework Agreement, which was negotiated by the Clinton administration.

On March 19, Bush declined to certify to Congress that North Korea was upholding the agreement, although the administration offered no evidence it had been violated.

Pyongyang, in turn, said "nuclear lunatics have taken office in the White House," and threatened to end its observance of the pact. Reflecting its desperate shortage of electricity, North Korea caused consternation in Washington by inviting Russia in to build a nuclear power plant, a move Moscow said it was "considering."



The bitter language between the countries is expected to preclude a resumption of talks. Analysts expressed concern it might have more serious consequences if North Korea resumes producing plutonium, or resumes the missile tests it pledged to suspend until next year as a gesture to the United States.

"Washington is playing a dangerous game," Robert M. Hathaway, director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, wrote in the daily Korea Times newspaper. "It will give new ammunition to the hard-liners in Pyongyang. It might lead North Korea to do something truly dangerous."

The twin light-water reactors were supposed to be built by next year by the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization, a consortium of the United States, Japan and South Korea. Each side has blamed the other for delays in the project, caused by difficult negotiations with North Korea, labor problems, opposition from Congress and lapses in funding. Excavation for the foundation of the plant is just being completed, and the pouring of the concrete is supposed to begin in August.

A key requirement of the deal is North Korean acceptance of an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. body that monitors nuclear development, to determine if nuclear fuel was diverted from a North Korean power plant to use in building weapons. The CIA has said North Korea may have diverted enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear bombs.

The United States and the IAEA want the inspections to begin now, and Bush has cited North Korea's refusal as part of his justification for his hard-line stance.

But North Korea suspects that Washington wants the IAEA inspections to start now to find a reason to stop work on the reactors project, according to Paik Haksoon, a North Korea expert at the Sejong Institute in Seoul.

"North Korea feels it has been deceived by the United States and cannot trust Bush," he said. "They are keeping their nuclear card until the United States has reached the point of no return" in constructing the light-water reactors, he said.

Chang, the South Korean official, agreed: "They want to see some progress for themselves," he said. "When the concrete pours in August, I think it might have some impact on their way of thinking."

The 1994 agreement requires the IAEA inspection to be completed before "key components" of the reactor are delivered, tentatively scheduled to occur in 2005. U.S. and IAEA officials have estimated the inspection could take three or four years and argue that inspectors should begin work now.

But North Korean officials have balked, complaining of Washington's desire for "early" verification. In addition, the construction timetable for the reactors has repeatedly slipped; some officials involved in the project have said it may not be finished until 2010. Chang said project officials no longer publicly predict a completion date.

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USA Today  
April 2, 2002  
Pg. 10

## **Military Plans To Resume Anthrax Shots**

The Pentagon is considering how to resume anthrax vaccinations for U.S. troops. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said officials are studying "technical questions" before resuming the program to inoculate all 2.4 million servicemembers. Vaccine supplies ran short while Bioport of Lansing, Mich., spent four years getting certification for a new manufacturing plant.

Several hundred military personnel have been discharged for refusing to have the shots. They cited health concerns. A study by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine concluded in March that the vaccine is safe and effective.

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Washington Times  
April 2, 2002  
Pg. 7

# MIT To Develop High-Tech Body Suit For U.S. Military

By Ellen Sorokin, The Washington Times

Students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will soon create uniforms that will shield U.S. soldiers from bullets and poison gas, heal wounds and allow them to leap over 20-foot walls.

MIT won a U.S. Army competition for a \$50 million contract to develop an Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies, where the uniforms will be created within the next five years. A total of 100 students and 35 professors from MIT's schools of engineering, science and architecture and planning will begin the project next month.

"Our goal is to greatly enhance the protection and survival of the infantry soldier," said Ned Thomas, an engineering professor who also is the director of the new institute.

The institute will focus on six key soldier capabilities: threat detection, threat neutralization (bulletproof clothing), concealment, enhanced human performance, real-time automated medical treatment, and reduced logistical footprint (lightening the load of a fully equipped soldier).

The institute's goal is to reduce the weight of a soldier's equipment from 145 pounds to 45 pounds — the amount of weight carried by warriors in Roman times.

"If we can provide our soldiers with more resources, more protection, with half the weight, that would be a huge step forward for us," said Capt. Amy Hannah, an Army spokesman.

The new uniforms will be made out of lightweight molecular materials that make the clothing as hard as metal to help repel bullets; act as a cast when a soldier breaks a leg; alert soldiers to the presence of poison gases or biological agents; apply medicine to wounds; and transmit soldiers' locations to a command post.

The uniforms will change color to imitate the outside environment, making the soldiers nearly invisible to the enemy. The uniforms will also include spring-loaded combat boots that will let soldiers leap over 20-foot walls.

"Imagine the psychological impact upon a foe when encountering squads of seemingly invincible warriors protected by armor and endowed with superhuman capabilities," Mr. Thomas said.

The institute will work with defense industry giants including DuPont and Raytheon, which will team up with the Army Natick Soldier Center, and the Army Research Laboratory in Aberdeen, Md., to integrate sensors into the fabric of soldiers' uniforms.

Lt. Col. Brian L. Baker, commander of MIT's Army ROTC program, said technology was used in the past "to take the man out of the loop." "Here you're applying the school's greatest strengths to helping the man or woman him- or herself," he said.

The university is also developing a way to recover and distill a soldier's sweat, to use for drinking water, through the uniform, a possibility imagined in the 1965 science-fiction novel "Dune," by Frank Herbert.

"Our government decided that it needs new technologies for the soldiers," said MIT professor Timothy Swager.

"What made us win was our strong background. We had many good ideas and a very proven track record in all the key areas that the Army needs."

MIT has a history of helping the Army improve its technology. In World War II, the school's Radiation Laboratory developed radar that warned troops of incoming aircraft. During the Cold War, the school's Instrumentation Laboratory developed guidance systems for missiles.

*This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

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Detroit Free Press

April 1, 2002

## Port Security Must Be Tightened, Officials Say

### *U.S. presses world for more checks of sealed containers*

By Seth Borenstein And Peter Boylan, Free Press Washington Staff

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.-- Terrorists and weapons of mass destruction could reach U.S. ports concealed among millions of uninspected cargo containers, U.S. maritime security officials say, but measures to stop them aren't likely to be in place before 2008 under current plans.

So U.S. officials are pressing the rest of the world to move faster to install a system of electronic devices on boats that would allow global tracking of incoming ships. The system, however, wouldn't be in place before mid-2004.

In addition, U.S. officials say they want penetrating checks into the backgrounds of foreign crew members and -- most important -- a better idea of what's inside the seaborne cargo containers that constitute nearly a half-trillion dollars' worth of U.S. imports annually.

The idea is to know who and what are arriving by sea long before they get to the United States, when they arrive and where they are at all times. And to do it soon.

If the measures work, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vernon Clark and others envision a satellite-based maritime defense system that would track U.S.-bound ships as effectively as air defenses track incoming planes.

To get there, however, U.S. officials concede that they must overcome resistance in some countries -- notably China -- to the United States screening and tracking their ships.

Until the new measures are in place, experts say, U.S. seaports will be far more vulnerable than airlines and airports, which have so far gotten much more attention.

Terrorists "came at us through the airline industry, and we tightened it up," said Rep. Corrine Brown, D-Fla., ranking Democrat on the House Maritime Transportation Subcommittee. "We can't wait for something to happen to our ports to act. There is a vulnerability there."

U.S. Customs Chief of Staff David Cohen said, at a two-day homeland and maritime security conference in Cambridge last week, "The threat of a low-grade nuclear weapon being shipped into a U.S. port is not farfetched. The impact of such a tragedy would be catastrophic."

One disastrous effect would be economic: a halt in container shipping to the United States. Last year, 7.8 million sealed cargo containers hauling \$480 billion worth of goods arrived in U.S. ports.

Only 2 percent of those containers were searched. Following Sept. 11, Assistant Customs Commissioner Bonnie Tischler said, "We need to know what's in the box."

U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Homeland Security and Navy officials are pressing for inspection of containers at their ports of origin and for quicker adoption of ship-tracking systems.

A proposal pending before the International Maritime Organization -- the United Nations agency that coordinates international shipping safety and security policies -- would require all vessels to install by 2008 automatic identification systems that would transmit a ship's identity, speed, position and course.

U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Homeland Security and Navy officials asked the IMO in May to move the deadline up to July 1, 2004, Collins said. Cruise ships, chemical-carrying boats and tankers must have tracking systems by next year.

If U.S. representatives can't get the deadline moved up, they plan to press world leaders at the Group of Eight economic meetings in June, said Adm. Brian Peterman, deputy senior director for protection at the federal Office of Homeland Security.

IMO members in the past have turned down requests for tighter security, such as the mandatory inspection of containers.

A high-ranking IMO official, who spoke to Knight Ridder Newspapers on condition of anonymity, said, "Ultimately, countries have their own sovereign rights and there is nothing the IMO or the U.S. can do, short of sending in an aircraft carrier, to make them give it up."

U.S. Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., said, "The IMO is a black hole in which good proposals go to die. The Coast Guard reps treat the IMO with kid gloves. We need to take a strong stance on this matter. Our sense of urgency has to be met."

To get individual countries to agree to screening of cargo containers, U.S. officials want to start with the world's 10 busiest ports, said Customs' Tischler. Those ports send nearly half the sealed containers that arrive in the United States.

Three of those top ports are in China, however, and China is unlikely to cooperate, said William Harris, a transportation expert on the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.

"It's a diplomatic problem of very substantial consequences," Harris said.

U.S. officials haven't even broached the subject with China, Tischler said.

Instead, they hope to win an initial agreement with the Dutch port of Rotterdam -- No. 5 on the list -- and use its assent to talk other ports and countries into the deal.

Besides the obstacles to tracking cargo and ships, two problems plague the checking of backgrounds of crew members, officials say.

Since Sept. 11, the Coast Guard has required all incoming commercial vessels to fax or e-mail crew lists 96 hours before landing. The Coast Guard's National Vessel Movement Center in Martinsburg, W. Va., reviews them.

But Coast Guard personnel don't have timely access to the FBI's or the Immigration and Naturalization Service's databases of criminals and terrorists. And as many as 9,000 crew names a day are coming in. Often, ships are docked before their crews are screened.

"The U.S. government has got to get itself organized," said Christopher Koch, president of the World Shipping Council, a Washington-based trade organization.

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Milwaukee Journal Sentinel  
March 31, 2002

## Can U.S. Be First To Attack Enemy?

*After Sept. 11, pre-emptive strike should be option, some experts argue*

By Craig Gilbert of the Journal Sentinel staff

Washington - Sept. 11 has made many things more thinkable.

One is the use of a weapon of mass destruction against the United States.

Another is what the U.S. might do to prevent that.

In calling a good offense the best defense, in vowing to stop the "world's worst leaders" from deploying "the world's worst weapons," President Bush has raised the prospect of a pre-emptive U.S. attack, an offensive strike for the express purpose of self-defense.

That would be a rather dramatic departure from national tradition.

"The fact is, there is almost no precedent in American diplomatic or military history for pre-emption," says Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis.

It would also raise a raft of military, diplomatic and legal questions:

Does a nation's right of self-defense include striking in anticipation of an enemy attack?

If so, under what circumstances?

Who decides? Can the U.S. act pre-emptively on its own, or must it seek the approval of the U.N. Security Council?

When Israel unilaterally and pre-emptively bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, U.S. leaders were critical. Later they were glad it happened.

Would a pre-emptive attack "bring on" the kind of doomsday terrorist attacks it is meant to forestall?

Would asserting that right lower the bar for other nations mulling aggression?

"Is it opening up a Pandora's box in respect to how other countries can act?" asks Duke law professor Michael Byers.

"One might trust the U.S. to behave responsibly, but the question is do we trust India or China to behave responsibly with the same right?"

These are some of the risks. But raising the stakes even more for the U.S. are the risks of not acting - of failing to pre-empt a preventable calamity.

"What must we do? Just sit here and take the blows like the World Trade Center, take the blows that biological weapons would pose to us?" Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said recently.

"If your goal is to stop it," he said, "you cannot stop it by defense."

### Questions proliferate

Since the president's "axis of evil" speech, there has been much debate about U.S. intentions toward Iraq. But the broader questions about pre-emptive force in the post-Cold War era have gotten less attention. And those questions, like nuclear and biological weapons, are going to proliferate.

This is not a realm where the rules guiding nations are clearly settled.

Only a handful of times has one country gone after another's capacity to make or use weapons of mass destruction, and in most cases, the combatants were already at war. The allies did it against Germany and Japan in World War II.

Iran tried to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1980. Iraq destroyed an Iranian reactor during several raids in the 1980s.

The U.S.-led coalition wrecked some of Iraq's weapons programs in the Persian Gulf War more than a decade ago.

But the most obvious precedent for U.S. action against rogue states is Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 - a "preventive" attack to destroy Saddam Hussein's future nuclear capacity.

The U.N. and the U.S. both condemned Israel at the time, because it hadn't been attacked. But that was before Iraq invaded Kuwait, before Hussein used chemical weapons and long before Sept. 11.

Has America's official view of pre-emption changed since 1981?

Many critics and supporters, here and abroad, see signs of a new doctrine from the Bush administration: that it's prepared to use force to stop some states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, to stop some states from using them, and to change some regimes that can't be trusted in an age of proliferation.

"The president appears to be asserting either the right or more likely the intention of the United States not to permit the development of nuclear weapons on the part of the so-called 'axis of evil,' " says Richard Kohn, military historian at the University of North Carolina. "I don't know that we've ever stated that if another country develops certain weapons we would attack them. That strikes me as new."

But just what the president is asserting is a matter of interpretation. He and his deputies haven't spelled out what they might do to pre-empt anticipated threats, or where.

"I will not wait on events while dangers gather," Bush said in his State of the Union address Jan. 29.

Others have been left to parse that, either because the strategy is undecided or because of a calculated "keep 'em guessing" ambiguity.

### **'Limits of sovereignty'**

U.S. officials do not acknowledge a new "doctrine" of pre-emption, but some have come close. Richard Haass, director of policy planning for the State Department, told *The New Yorker* that "what you're seeing from this administration is the emergence of a new principle or body of ideas - I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine - about the limits of sovereignty."

If a government fails to follow certain rules - say, supports terrorists - other nations gain the right to intervene, Haass said.

"In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or preemptory self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked," he told the magazine.

Advocates of pre-emptive action certainly perceive a shift.

"You will in fact see acts of pre-emption. That not only deserves the support of the American people, but commends it," says Frank Gaffney, a Pentagon official under President Reagan.

But while there's little precedent for the U.S. to act pre-emptively, the rationale behind it isn't entirely new.

In a policy shift under President Clinton, Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced more aggressive efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction among "rogue" states. Put another way, the U.S. was adding military tools to the traditional diplomatic ones (treaties, sanctions) against proliferation, including better ways to track and attack a hostile weapons program.

The spread of massively lethal weapons also has fed a spirited debate over pre-emption among experts in international law.

The laws of war draw on both treaty - the 1945 United Nations Charter - and custom. Traditional views on pre-emptive force were shaped by a historical footnote known as the Caroline affair, a brief skirmish along the U.S.-Canada border in 1837. The Caroline was a steamer used by rebels opposed to British rule in Canada. British troops attacked it in U.S. waters and sent it tumbling over Niagara Falls.

In an exchange of letters with Britain's Lord Ashburton, Secretary of State Daniel Webster laid out a test for pre-emption that became widely accepted - that there be "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" - and that the force be proportional to the threat.

But since 1945, the guiding legal framework has been found in the U.N. charter. Article 51 recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."

Does that include what lawyers call "anticipatory" self-defense?

Byers of Duke says the short answer is no, since self-defense and armed attack are explicitly linked. He says rogue states and apocalyptic weapons have led people to rethink the question, but "it hasn't yet changed the law."

That means a country must look to the U.N. Security Council for authority to strike first, he argues. Act unilaterally and you damage the international system and invite bad actors to use self-defense as a pretext for aggression.

You also give up the moral high ground, says Gaddis, a Cold War historian. "There's a very high threshold that has to be crossed," he contends.

But scholars certainly differ on the legal thresholds. Some have an expansive notion of anticipatory self-defense. Some say the Security Council isn't functional enough to referee these issues. Some say a nation's got to do what it's got to do.

Abuse of pre-emption is a legitimate concern, says Robert F. Turner of the University of Virginia School of Law.

"It is true that if you have a legal doctrine that says you can invade your neighbor any time you claim he's going to invade you, that sure gives an awful lot of slippery ground to the bad guys," says Turner, co-founder of UVa.'s Center for National Security Law and a Pentagon official at the time of the Osirak bombing.

But Turner thinks U.S. action in Iraq would be solidly grounded in self-defense. And he argues that in rare cases the legitimacy of striking first is clear and compelling.

"I see an awful lot of Americans being at risk of horrible death. It seems to me if international law says you have to wait and give (Hussein) the first kick, then international law is part of the problem," he says.

Thomas Franck of New York University Law School says the U.N. Security Council has several times judged anticipatory attacks after the fact, approving, condemning or letting them pass without comment. There was no condemnation when Israel struck first in the 1967 war after Egypt mobilized - a classic and rare instance of modern military pre-emption.

"So it's pretty clear where the consequences of waiting to be attacked would be disastrous, and there's clear evidence that can be presented to the Security Council such a threat exists and is highly imminent, the council will not object to the use of force being taken in anticipatory self-defense," says Franck.

But at what point does the rationale ripen? Scholars like to distinguish between "preventive attack" (which is what you do before your enemy acquires a big weapon) and "pre-emptive attack" (which is what you do when you think your enemy's about to use one).

Action against Iraq could involve either, since it is believed to have chemical and biological weapons, but no nuclear arms.

Are both cases potentially legitimate acts of self-defense?

"If your question is, is it legal to use force to prevent a country from acquiring a weapon of mass destruction, in the old days people would have said no," says law professor Ruth Wedgwood of Yale. But she says there's a "different sensibility" now, especially in light of Iraq's behavior.

### **Setting out conditions**

This is Franck's formulation:

"With weapons of mass destruction, you have to show a very active program, and that the program is on the verge of success. They have the means of delivery and they're the kinds of people who've given clear indication that once they've got them, they would use them. If you can't show that, then every country that has any of those kinds of weapons, including, incidentally, Israel, would be fair game."

It's possible these questions won't be tested in Iraq. The U.S. could act there without arguing its right to anticipatory attack. It could claim instead a link between Iraq and al-Qaida, or Iraqi violations of ceasefire terms after the Gulf War.

But with the continued spread of catastrophic weapons, the issues surrounding pre-emption will persist. And those issues are hardly black and white, since many skeptics about pre-emption can imagine the right conditions, and many enthusiasts agree that those conditions are rare.

Says former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, who has called for pre-emptive action against Iraq:

"Obviously one only does this in extremis."

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Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

March 31, 2002

## **Analysis Considers 'Nuclear Hitler'**

By Craig Gilbert of the Journal Sentinel staff

Washington - How should America deal with a "nuclear Hitler"?

Should it ever strike first?

In an analysis written seven years ago for the National Defense University, the current director of the Air Force Counter-Proliferation Center posed and answered those questions.

Pre-emptive action is appropriate in "very special cases," argued the author, Barry R. Schneider.

The paper is not a statement of government policy. But it's an example of the kinds of questions decision-makers might pose when considering a pre-emptive attack against a dangerously armed foe.

Here are some of the tests Schneider offered:

1. Is the enemy undeterrable, violent and a risk-taker?

The target would have to be a "sworn and dedicated enemy," ruthlessly violent, "erratic, unpredictable and quite possibly non-deterrable by the threat of retaliation against his country's assets."

2. Are U.S. vital interests directly threatened?

It would have to be a "kill or be killed scenario." The enemy would have to pose a clear and present danger of striking the U.S. or its allies after acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

3. Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable?

The U.S. would need to document the existence of weapons of mass destruction (to counter enemy denials), locate them and be able to destroy them with conventional weapons "without causing extensive collateral damage to civilian populations."

4. Is the U.S. homeland safe from enemy weapons of mass destruction?

"Starting an armed conflict, especially a highly dangerous one against a heavily armed and dangerous enemy, could only be done in the existential moment when the U.S. president and his top national security leaders were utterly convinced that the path of inaction was absolutely catastrophic; and that further delay and a failure to act would be fatal. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that a WMD could not be used against the United States."

5. Has the U.S. exhausted all other non-military options first?

"To do otherwise would be immoral, set a very dangerous precedent, undermine international law and could ruin the good reputation of the United States."

6. Is the U.S. committed to win?

A pre-emptive strike is an act of war, and U.S. leaders must be "fully prepared for what follows."

Schneider writes that these are guidelines, not "iron laws."

Pre-emptive assault should be reserved for the most criminal regimes.

"Think of Hitler's Germany in 1940 and add a German nuclear facility that could produce an atomic bomb in a year," he writes.

The 1995 paper cites Iraq, North Korea, Iran (today's "axis of evil") and Libya as special threats.

Schneider concludes:

"Conditions would have to be so dire, and yet so precisely favorable, that pre-emptive counter-proliferation attacks were the only route to take, the least dangerous of two or more risky options."

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Washington Times

April 3, 2002

Pg. 13

## **Blair Leaves Iraq Dossier Home**

By Al Webb, The Washington Times

LONDON — Prime Minister Tony Blair will fly to the United States on Friday for a summit with President Bush over the future of Iraq, but without a dossier on Baghdad's nuclear and chemical weapons threat that he had been expected to take along.

Instead, diplomatic sources said, the two leaders would focus their attention on how best "in general" to deal with the nagging problem of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Blair also is expected to put what was described as "gentle but firm pressure" on Mr. Bush for a tougher line on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

The original aim of the summit at Mr. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, was to tackle the issue of Iraq, drawing on a major report compiled by British intelligence agencies on Saddam's buildup of weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear bomb and missile program.

Political and diplomatic sources said the agenda has been changed because the Iraq dossier is still not ready for release, and because the Middle East crisis threatens to spiral out of control. Some observers in Britain say Washington is a less-than-enthusiastic party to resolve the Mideast crisis.

The prime minister and the president will have only the weekend together at their barbecue-and-beer summit before Mr. Blair has to fly back home in time for the state funeral Tuesday for Queen Mother Elizabeth, who died on Easter eve at the age of 101.

Mr. Blair is scheduled to leave for the United States after a service Friday at Westminster Hall to receive the coffin of the queen mother, officially starting 31/2 days of lying in state. The prime minister's office said he was going ahead with the Texas summit with the "full agreement" of Buckingham Palace.

Although Mr. Blair has begun a campaign to prepare the British public for military strikes, alongside U.S. forces, aimed at toppling Saddam, Downing Street now insists the summit is "in no sense a council of war."

London's Financial Times reported this week that the release of the dossier, expected last week from Cabinet office intelligence chiefs, had been delayed amid speculation that it provided insufficient evidence to support a war against Baghdad.

But the prime minister's office said the report was not ready for publication. The Foreign Office insisted that "when the time is right, we will release further material."

Diplomatic sources said the Mideast crisis is now considered a major stumbling block. One source said London is eager to see Washington bring more pressure on both Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to "back off" and calm the turbulence in Israel.

Meanwhile, Mr. Blair is under some pressure to back off his tough line of threats against Iraq. More than 120 members of Parliament from his own Labor Party have signed a House of Commons motion expressing their "unease" and calling for "restraint" in any plans for military action against Saddam.

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Washington Post

April 3, 2002

Pg. 4

## **Progress Reported On Arms Cuts**

President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke yesterday for the second time in less than a week as the White House reported progress toward agreements on reductions of offensive nuclear weapons.

The two presidents, in their 15-minute phone conversation, also "said they were satisfied that negotiators had signed an interim protocol to resolve the Russian ban on U.S. chicken imports," White House spokesman Sean McCormack said.

Bush, who meets Putin in Russia for summit talks next month, spoke to him last Wednesday about the nuclear weapons agreement and U.S. concerns over the chicken ban that is so damaging to U.S. poultry farmers.

Yesterday, Bush and Putin also agreed that discussions on a new NATO-Russia relationship were making progress, McCormack said.

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Aerospace Daily

April 3, 2002

## **Earth-Penetrating Nukes May Not Violate Restrictions, Says DOE Official**

The Pentagon's interest in repackaging existing nuclear payloads on earth-penetrating weapons may not violate the 1994 congressional ban on developing new nuclear weapons, according to Gen. John A. Gordon, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and undersecretary of energy for nuclear security.

The Department of Defense is interested in concepts that could fit its requirement for defeating hard and deeply buried targets, including the use of repackaged nuclear weapons, Gordon told defense reporters in Washington April 2.

"There is, as you know, an effort that came out of [the Department of] Defense to look at a strengthened and improved earth penetrators," Gordon said. In looking at nuclear warheads, however, that program is aimed at repackaging nuclear weapons and not developing new ones, he said.

Gordon said a repackaged nuclear payload would not necessarily violate the 1994 ban, although he said it depends on the congressional intent behind the restrictions.

"I wouldn't call it a new weapon, but some others might," he said.

While the Pentagon's interest in earth-penetrating nuclear weapons was highlighted last month when the classified Nuclear Posture Review was leaked to the press, DOD last year informed Congress about its work on repackaging nuclear warheads on earth-penetrating weapons.

A repackaged payload is not a new weapon in his view, Gordon said, because the warhead is just being placed on a different weapon. "The yields that are in it are the yields that are in it," he said of the nuclear payload.



But the yield could be rendered as a lower yield, he said, by using only the primary nuclear charge that acts as the trigger for a nuclear explosion and removing what's known as the "secondary," which provides the weapon's explosive energy. That would still not be a "new" weapon, he argued, because it's the same nuclear device. The problem with an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon may not be legal, but technical. Getting the nuclear payload to function after the trauma of penetrating through the earth is not easy. The nuclear payload must be packaged in a system that allows it to withstand the high G-load that is experienced from penetrating the earth, as well as the crush of hitting the ground, Gordon said. To get the nuclear weapon to function, engineers would need to stiffen the structural elements, making sure the attachments are very hard, and then test it to make sure it can survive the G-loads and ignite, he said. For a deeply penetrating, nuclear-armed munition, it is the penetrator, not the nuclear explosive, that allows the weapon to reach a deeply buried target. However, for targets that cannot be reached by the initial penetration, a nuclear explosive would be useful in creating a large shock, he said. Other payloads can be used for earth-penetrating weapons, Gordon said, but "clearly, the nuclear option is the way to get the heavy shock you would expect if you can't penetrate all the way." He said if the military can penetrate the whole depth to the target, there is no need for a nuclear explosive because other fills can do the job. Gordon said, for example, that the new thermobaric weapon would be a good candidate if the penetrator can reach the target. Gordon declined to speculate on what sort of deeply buried targets low-yield weapons would be used against. That's a DOD issue, he said. In a recent interview with The DAILY, Maj. Gen. Daniel Leaf, the U.S. Air Force's director of operational requirements, declined to comment on the requirements for an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon.

-- *Sharon Weinberger*

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New York Times  
April 2, 2002

## **Bioterror Agents Join List Of `Emerging' Ills**

By Denise Grady

When Kathy T. Nguyen died of inhalation anthrax in New York on Oct. 31, the police and medical investigators were quickly deployed to find the source of the spores that had infected her. They interviewed 232 co-workers, 27 neighbors and 35 acquaintances in an effort to reconstruct her final two months. They searched her apartment and swabbed surfaces there and in her workplace and the subway stations she used. They vacuumed her clothes in search of spores. They used her subway fare card to trace her path around the city, studied her phone records and inspected her usual laundry, post office and grocery store.

They never found a single spore or any other clue to how Ms. Nguyen became infected.

Describing the investigation at a medical meeting last week in Atlanta, Dr. Timothy Holtz, a preventive medicine fellow at the New York City Health Department, concluded with a slide that said, "We will likely never know."

The Atlanta meeting, attended by 2,000 doctors and scientists, was an international conference on emerging infectious diseases, organized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization and other groups. "Emerging" refers to newly discovered infectious diseases or old ones that have rebounded, turned up in new places or become drug resistant, and whose incidence has increased in the last two decades or threatens to rise soon. Previous conferences focused on malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis, yellow fever, mad cow disease and West Nile encephalitis. Now, anthrax and other potential bioterror agents — smallpox, plague, tularemia, botulism, Q fever and the Ebola and Marburg viruses — have been added to the ranks of emerging infectious diseases.

Addressing the conference, Dr. James Hughes, the director of the C.D.C.'s National Center for Infectious Diseases, said that although the anthrax attack last autumn was small — it killed 5 people and made 17 others ill — it quickly overwhelmed the nation's laboratories.

"We learned we were not adequately prepared," he said, noting that America's capacity to deal with a sudden increase in need for services was deficient not only in laboratories, but also in the production of vaccines and antibiotics and the availability of hospital beds. He said the ability to detect outbreaks promptly also needed improving. Dr. Hughes added that bioterrorism and naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease would "complicate U.S. and global security over the next 20 years."

The federal government plans to distribute \$918 million to the states next month for bioterrorism preparedness. Dr. Hughes and other experts say this is the time to improve the entire public health system to combat other threats from infectious disease, like flu epidemics, antibiotic resistant bacteria and illnesses spread by food, water, insects and animals. In the United States, for instance, 76 million people a year get sick from food-borne infections, and 1 in 1,000 are hospitalized. Over all, the cost is \$6.5 billion.

Diseases carried by mosquitoes and ticks are also a considerable problem in the United States. Dr. Duane Gubler, a specialist in insect-borne diseases who works for the C.D.C. in Fort Collins, Colo., said West Nile encephalitis, never detected in the United States before it occurred in New York in 1999, had spread faster than expected.

In 2001, people were infected in nine states and birds in 27 states. Although the disease may cause only a mild illness in healthy people, it can be severe and even fatal in older people. Of 149 known cases, 18 people have died; but there may be more cases that have not been reported because victims did not get very sick. The virus is carried by 29 species of mosquitoes, 100 species of birds and numerous mammals.

"It will continue to spread and will be a major public health problem in the next decade," Dr. Gubler said. "Most states should consider themselves at risk."

He said dengue fever, another viral disease carried by mosquitoes, had become a major problem worldwide, with 50 million to 100 million cases a year, including 200,000 to 500,000 taking a hemorrhagic form that can be fatal.

Before 1980, he said, dengue was not a problem in Central or South America, but now it is endemic in 27 countries, including Brazil, which Dr. Gubler described as in the throes of a "roaring epidemic." Last year Hawaii had its first dengue outbreak in 56 years, on Maui.

"My guess is that the next global public health emergency will be yellow fever," Dr. Gubler said.

Yellow fever is also carried by mosquitoes, and epidemiologists expect epidemics to occur in cities in South America, and also Asia and the South Pacific. "It will get here by plane," Dr. Gubler said, "but I don't anticipate a major epidemic here."

A vaccine exists, but it is in short supply.

The comeback of insect-borne diseases has revealed a glaring lack of trained people who know how to collect and identify mosquitoes, and who know how insects interact with microbes and people to spread disease. The field, known as vector biology or medical entomology, began shrinking in the 1970's because diseases carried by insects had diminished so much that there were few jobs for vector biologists.

When West Nile encephalitis broke out in New York, Dr. Gubler said, the city had trouble finding a medical entomologist. Dr. Gubler said he and other researchers hoped that the C.D.C. and the National Institutes of Health would develop training programs to help bring the field back.

Another concern is the spread of antibiotic resistant bacteria, which cause infections that can be very difficult to treat. Dr. Keith Klugman, a professor of infectious diseases at Emory University, described a "global pandemic" of antibiotic resistance in the bacterium *Streptococcus pneumoniae*, commonly called pneumococcus. It is a common cause of respiratory illnesses and kills more than three million children a year.

The pneumococcus also causes ear infections, and many studies show that the more a child is treated with antibiotics, the more likely resistance is to develop. Low doses of antibiotics given for a long time are especially likely to breed resistance. Particularly worrisome is that the bacteria are becoming resistant to fluoroquinolones, a powerful and much-needed class of drugs. Dr. Klugman called fluoroquinolone resistance a "potential disaster" and said he expected it to increase greatly in the United States in the next four to five years.

Possible solutions include vaccinating children to prevent pneumococcal infections and developing better diagnostic tests to tell viral respiratory infections from bacterial ones, so that antibiotics are not given unnecessarily. Research is also needed, Dr. Klugman said, to determine the best way to use antibiotics; in some cases, the widely prescribed 10-day regimens may be contributing to resistance, and shorter courses with higher doses may work just as well and cause fewer problems.

Speakers at the Atlanta conference also warned that people can catch common infections in utterly unexpected ways.

When salmonella, a common food poisoning infection, broke out last spring at an elementary school in Minnesota, state and county health departments first investigated the school lunch program. But they noticed that the children most likely to be infected belonged to the science club or to another after-school program, the adventure club.

Interviews revealed that the science club had been dissecting owl pellets, clumps of indigestible bone and fur that owls regurgitate after eating.

In Minnesota, the pellets were being dissected on a table in the cafeteria. After the science club was finished, the adventure club ate its snacks off the same table, without its being washed. In fact, the table was not washed until the following day — by which time another group of children had eaten off it.

The source of the pellets was a barred owl at a local nature center. Cultures of leftover pellets and the owl's droppings turned up the same strain of salmonella found in the children; the bacteria almost certainly came from the owl's diet of thawed, uncooked chicks.

Fred Anderson, an epidemiologist in Washington County, Minn., said there was no reason to ban owl pellets from school programs. But, he suggested, the pellets should not be dissected in the lunchroom. And the young scientists must wash their hands when they are finished. Better still, owl pellets can be sterilized in an oven, or sterilized pellets can be bought from commercial suppliers.

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02 April 2002

## **Rumsfeld Says Possible Biological Attack Is Chief Concern**

(Defense Secretary interviewed on MSNBC March 28) (1260)

Terrorists and terrorist organizations want to acquire weapons of mass destruction, says Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but he is primarily concerned about them getting and using biological weapons.

Interviewed on MSNBC March 28, Rumsfeld said nuclear weapons are relatively more difficult to handle, manage, transport and detonate than are chemical or biological weapons. The latter "can be done in relatively small places with dual-use equipment [i.e., with both military and civilian application], and there are a variety of delivery mechanisms. Some biological weapons involve contagions, and that's a terribly dangerous thing," Rumsfeld said.

Rumsfeld also spoke about the possible casualties caused by use of weapons of mass destruction, the extent and dispersal of the terrorist al-Qaida network, the U.S. strategy of denying terrorists sanctuary, and the decision to close the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Information.

Following are excerpts from the interview:

(begin excerpts)

DoD News Briefing  
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  
March 28, 2002

(Television Interview with Brian Williams, MSNBC TV)

Williams: ... [W]e begin with Donald Rumsfeld himself reminding us how our world has changed.

Rumsfeld: Our margin for error has shrunk enormously. When you think of the power and reach of weapons, and the fact that the weapons of mass destruction can kill not thousands as we had with the attacks on the Pentagon here in this building where we sit, and also in New York, but tens of hundreds of thousands of people can be killed. We don't have a big margin for error. We have to be right. We have to see that we go after these folks where they are.

Williams: If we all knew what you know, would we be more or less nervous about daily life in the United States?

Rumsfeld: Oh, my goodness. I don't know that it serves any useful purpose to be nervous about things. It's a difficult world. It's a dangerous world. There are a lot of people who have been trained to kill, and to terrorize. They're located in 40 or 50 countries in cells today as we talk. And they are willing to sacrifice their lives to kill other people. Can we deal with that? Sure. Is it likely there will be another terrorist attack? Sure, it is true. ...

Williams: The United States didn't get them all. They are gone. Do you worry that too many of them got away?

Rumsfeld: Oh, goodness. I worry that they're all over the world. You bet. There were thousands trained in those training camps, but there is no question if it's not an army, a navy, or an air force, all they have to do is just melt into the mountainside, go into a cave, go back into their village, go across one of those porous borders of Afghanistan. They've transited, we know, they've gone through Iran down into ships, and headed -- tried to get into Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, and various other Middle Eastern countries. All you can do is keep after them, keep putting pressure....

Williams: ... September 11th made it painfully clear that terrorism against American targets is not the distant threat that many of us might have once thought. Hijacked jetliners fully loaded with fuel flying into office buildings took care of that. But is there an even greater, more deadly threat to come -- nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists?....

Rumsfeld: There is no question but the terrorists and terrorist organizations want weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, however, are more difficult to handle and manage, more difficult to detonate, more difficult to transport, and if I were asked, among those nuclear, chemical and biological, which did I think was the more likely and the more worrisome to me at the moment, I probably would say biological. It can be done in relatively small places with dual-use equipment, and there are a variety of delivery mechanisms. Some biological weapons involve contagions, and that's a terribly dangerous thing....

Williams: American forces are in countries, as we speak, that you probably never dreamed they'd be deployed in when you started this job. Where does it end?

Rumsfeld: Well, I think we have to keep the pressure on, and we can't allow Afghanistan to be stopped as a haven and a sanctuary and simply have some other country become the sanctuary and the haven. So what we have to do, as the president said, is go after the terrorists where they are, but also make sure that other countries are not creating a sanctuary for terrorists, as a substitute for Afghanistan. So we're trying to help train some folks in Yemen, we're trying to help train some folks in the Philippines, and relatively small numbers of people, in the hundreds, not in the thousands.

Williams: You have no concerns that we're in too many places right now?

Rumsfeld: Look, my concern is that the al Qaeda will find a country where they can find a sanctuary and a haven, and continue their attacks on the United States, on our friends and allies, and on our deployed forces, and on our interests. And we can't let that happen....

Williams: How often are you forced to shave the truth in that briefing room, because American lives are at stake?

Rumsfeld: I just don't. I think our credibility is so much more important than shaving the truth. So when I don't know something I just say I don't know it. If it's something I'm not going to talk about, I just say I'm not going to talk about it. If it's advice I give the president or the National Security Council I just tell them I don't get into that. If it's an intelligence matter I say that we don't discuss intelligence. There isn't a need for anyone to do that in the Pentagon.

Williams: The United States did use misinformation in World War II liberally. And a recent attempt in this building to maybe engage in a little misinformation you received some unshirted hell from people, and kind of took it back. Mistake?

Rumsfeld: I don't know. There's no question we have to do information operations. For example, if the Taliban is telling people that the food we're delivering is poisoned, we have to tell them it's not. If they're saying this is a war against Moslems, we have to tell them it's not, that that's not true. And so we had a radio program that we were beaming there, and that is not misinformation, that is not disinformation, it is information. And that is what we were doing. And the information operations activities that the Pentagon was planning to do in the Office of Strategic Information were perfectly appropriate.

For whatever reason, the implication was drawn that they were going to do things that were not appropriate. So what do you do? Well, I said, let's close up the shop. Since that's what the perception is, let's close it up. We'll go ahead and do what we have to do anyway. I said that at the press briefing, and we will. We'll do exactly what we have to

do to protect the lives of the men and women in uniform, and to see that our country is successful, but it doesn't involve lying....

(end excerpts)

<http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=02040201.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml>

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New York Daily News

April 3, 2002

## **Defector: I Bought Iraq Nukes**

By Helen Kennedy, Daily News Washington Bureau

An Iraqi defector has given Pentagon officials a detailed inside look at Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons programs — and told of buying nuclear materials with a briefcase full of \$100 bills.

The defector, whose story is recounted in the new edition of Vanity Fair magazine, says he was involved in the most sensitive of Iraq's secret arms programs before fleeing a year and a half ago.

Presented to U.S. officials by the Iraqi National Congress, a London-based exile group pushing for an American attack on Iraq, the defector says Saddam is close to finishing a long-range ballistic missile that could hit Cairo; Ankara; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Nicosia, Cyprus, or Tehran.

The defector said he helped run a network of shell corporations that smuggled missile parts hidden inside TV sets and refrigerators.

He claims also to have worked on weapons programs, saying he came up with the idea to house eight mobile germ labs in meat and dairy trucks.

The defector told Vanity Fair he also was involved in Saddam's nuke program, saying he and two colleagues were sent on a clandestine trip to Tanzania in 1994.

He says they met with five Eastern Europeans and traded a briefcase stuffed with \$100 bills for a heavy metal trunk of "what looked like pieces of black rock, glittery."

The description could match pieces of spent nuclear reactor fuel rods — the type of material that could be used in a radiological, or dirty, bomb.

The defector was one of 29 suspected conspirators arrested in 1998. He says he was tortured, interrogated and sexually abused for six months, then freed when it was clear he was innocent. He said such treatment normally serves to frighten Iraqis into line, but he resolved to escape.

The defector also said Iraq is backing and training the Hamas leaders who are sending suicide bombers into Israel — even showing them how to build bombs.

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Washington Post

April 4, 2002

Pg. 10

## **North Korea To Resume Nuclear Talks**

### ***Decision Suggests Pyongyang Won't Break Ties to U.S., Allies***

By Peter Slevin, Washington Post Staff Writer

North Korea announced yesterday that it will resume discussions on two nuclear reactors being built there by an international consortium supported by the United States. A U.S. desire for broader negotiations remains unrequited.

North Korea's willingness to continue practical discussions about the reactors follows a pair of meetings in New York with American diplomats, U.S. officials said. The decision seems to indicate that Koreans do not intend to break ties with the United States or its allies, despite several months of strong rhetorical exchanges.

The announcement came as a South Korean special envoy began a three-day visit to North Korea in hopes of reviving official dialogue on the divided peninsula. The arrival of Lim Dong-won in Pyongyang marked the first public contact between the two Koreas since November.

Relations between the United States and North Korea have been unusually tense since January, when President Bush declared North Korea to be part of an "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq. Meetings on the twin reactors took place in February, but the North Koreans declined to participate last month.

"These are just mundane, practical issues that are related to construction of these plants," said Brian Kremer, spokesman for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the international consortium that includes the United States, Japan and South Korea. The sessions are scheduled about once a month.

Despite the brief interruption of formal meetings, contacts continued at the power plant work sites and the diplomatic friction had no effect on the project, Kremer said. Twice in March, State Department envoy Jack Pritchard met with North Korean representatives in New York, urging more ambitious discussions.

"We continue to await a response on our long-standing proposal to meet with them on broader areas of concern," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said yesterday.

Two weeks ago, the Bush administration asserted that North Korea was falling short of its obligations under the 1994 agreement that promised two light water reactors in return for a freeze in Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Despite the finding, the administration authorized delivery of \$95 million in fuel oil as promised by the agreement.

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